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TOWARD A PRIVATE ORDERING SOLUTION  
TO THE ANTICOMMONS PROBLEM 
F. Scott Kieff* 
Troy A. Paredes**
Abstract: The problems of the intellectual property (“IP”) anticommons are 
infamous. Many people fear that the potential for vast numbers of IP rights to 
cover a single good or service will prevent an enterprise from even attempting 
to launch a business for fear of being unduly taxed or retarded or simply held 
up. This Article offers a solution based on private ordering within the context 
of existing laws. This approach uses a limited liability entity structured so that 
IP owners are given an actual stake in the operating business and thus an 
incentive to participate in the enterprise; and yet at the same time, the IP 
owners face a number of constraints that mitigate their interest in acting 
opportunistically by holding out. Through careful attention to IP owner 
payoffs and self-restraint, the proposed structure is designed to coordinate 
behavior among relevant IP owners, thus overcoming the anticommons 
problem. This approach is designed to help lawyers serve their role as 
transaction cost engineers who can structure relationships in ways that get 
deals done. 
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Introduction 
 A recent explosion in the IP literature focuses on a set of problems re-
lating to an arrangement of property rights called an “anticommons.”1 The 
basic distinguishing feature of the IP anticommons is the existence of such a 
large number of IP rights covering a single good or service that the provi-
sion of that good or service is feared to be unduly taxed and retarded, if not 
outright prevented.2
 An often-discussed example of the anticommons problem is DNA-on-
a-chip technology involving micro-arrays of thousands, or even tens of thou-
sands, of individual pieces of DNA. Each piece of DNA may be covered by 
a different patent; and many of the patents may have different owners.3 It is 
feared that entering a business based on such a chip would require the busi-
ness owner to identify, find, and then successfully transact with a staggering 
number of individual IP owners. Such transaction costs, combined with the 
risk that any one of the IP owners could hold out and compromise the entire 
operation, raise a number of problems for business and for the public at 
large. Because access to such a plethora of IP rights is required, those want-
                                                                                                                           
1 See, e.g., Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The 
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 Science 698 passim (1998) (introducing the term “an-
ticommons” to IP); Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transi-
tion from Marx to Markets, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 621, 623–24 (1998) (defining anticommons property 
generally). A separate body of work has explored the ways in which IP can be seen as a “semi-
commons.” See generally Robert A. Heverly, The Information Semi-Commons, 18 Berkeley Tech. 
L.J. 1127 (2003); Henry E. Smith, Governing the Tele-Semicommons, 22 Yale J. on Reg. 289 
(2005); Henry E. Smith, Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the Open Fields, 29 J. 
Legal Stud. 131 (2000); Greg R. Vetter, Open Source Licensing and Scattering Opportunism in 
Software Standards, 48 B.C. L. Rev. qqq (2007); Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property: An Infor-
mation Cost Approach (Feb. 7, 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors). 
2 See Michael A. Heller, The Dynamic Analytics of Property Law, 2 Theoretical Inquiries L. 
79, 87–89 (2001) (providing a detailed description of the term as it applies to IP). 
3 See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 699; Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On 
the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 839, 863–66, 875 (1990) (discussing 
the general possibility of patents blocking downstream work); Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on 
the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. Econ. Persp. 29, 30–32 
(1991) (same). For examples of recent governmental reports expressing the same concerns, see 
Comm’n on Intellectual Prop. Rights, Innovation & Pub. Health, World Health Org., Public Health 
Innovation and Intellectual Property Rights (2006), available at 
http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/documents/thereport/EN 
PublicHealthReport.pdf; Comm. on Intellectual Prop. Rights in Genomic & Protein Research & 
Innovation, Nat’l Research Council, Reaping the Benefits of Genomic and Proteomic Research: 
Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation, and Public Health (2005), available at 
http://fermat.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=11487& page 
=R1; FTC, To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of Competition and Patent Law and Pol-
icy (2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf; World Health Org., 
Genetics, Genomics and the Patenting of DNA: Review of Potential Implications for Health in 
Developing Countries (2005), available at http://www.who.int/genomics/FullReport.pdf. 
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ing to enter a line of business using DNA-on-a-chip technology fear that 
they cannot, and those seeking access to the products that such businesses 
would have produced are left wanting.4 The impact may be life threaten-
ing—preventing promising diagnoses and treatments targeted to patients 
having a number of specific genetic profiles.5
 To be sure, the theoretical literature has debated whether there is in fact 
an anticommons problem for property rights in general and for IP in particu-
lar.6 In his influential work on anticommons, Michael Heller has focused 
on the fragmentation of interests in an asset.7 In response, Richard Epstein 
and Bruce Kuhlik8 and one of the present authors9 have pointed out that 
when the permission of bureaucrats is required, as was the case for the un-
used stores in the post-socialist economy that were the topic of Heller’s ini-
tial work, efforts by such bureaucrats to openly trade their permission for 
personal gain are likely to trigger various forms of legal liability for graft, 
bribery, public corruption, and the like; and the “market” for buying re-
quired approvals from bureaucrats is likely to be relatively thin. IP rights 
are different, they continue, because an IP owner in the United States does 
not have the same incentive to avoid open transactions because such deals 
are lawful and important to monetizing the value of the IP. Other work by 
one of the present authors extends the analysis to show how the anticom-
mons problem is inapposite to IP rights that are clear, certain, owned by a 
residual claimant, and openly tradable; and that the anticommons problem 
studied by Heller thereby can be seen as no different from the problem of 
                                                                                                                           
4 The holdout problem discussed here is akin to the problem raised by requiring unanimity in 
any decision by a group of stakeholders. For example, the problems of requiring unanimity among 
lenders in efforts to restructure debt are well explored in a separate literature. See generally Robert 
B. Ahdieh, Between Mandate and Market: Contract Transition in the Shadow of the International 
Order, 53 Emory L.J. 691 (2004); William W. Bratton & G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Debt Reform 
and the Best Interest of Creditors, 57 Vand. L. Rev. 1 (2004). 
5 See, e.g., Robert F. Service, Microchip Arrays Put DNA on the Spot, 282 Science 396, 397 
(1998). 
6 See infra notes 8–11 and accompanying text. 
7 See generally Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 1; Heller, supra note 1. 
8 See Richard Epstein & Bruce N. Kuhlik, Navigating the Anticommons for Pharmaceutical 
Patents: Steady the Course on Hatch-Waxman 4–5 (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch. John M. Olin Program 
in Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 209 (2d Series), 2004), available at http://www. 
law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/WkngPprs_201-25/209.rae-bk.anticommons.pdf. 
9 See F. Scott Kieff, Coordination, Property & Intellectual Property: An Unconventional Ap-
proach to Anticompetitive Effects & Downstream Access 42–46 (Wash. Univ. Sch. of Law Pub. 
Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 06–06–01, Stanford Law Sch. 
John M. Olin Program in Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 323, 2006), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=910656. 
4 Kieff & Paredes 
permit thickets studied earlier by Epstein.10 Put simply, it is the nature of an 
IP owner’s right to exclude or say “no” (or, more precisely, the nature of the 
associated right to say “yes” to a deal) that is the key to the supposed prob-
lem of too many diffuse rights of exclusion—whether termed a “permit 
thicket” or an “anticommons”—rather than the number of individuals from 
whom permission must be sought. Nevertheless, because IP rights in the 
real world never will be perfectly clear, certain, and openly tradable, and 
because there will never be an absolutely definitive set of all residual claim-
ants, the anticommons problem is one worth further exploration.11
 Suggested responses to the anticommons problem include a host of law 
and policy reforms that target certain types of patents.12 Representative ex-
amples include a shift towards relaxed enforcement of IP rights that in ef-
fect would leave enforcement of certain patents only backed up by a liabil-
ity rule rather than a property rule.13 Other examples include the outright 
elimination or prevention of such patents through the use of various en-
hanced patentability and patent-validity requirements, such as utility, statu-
tory subject matter, description, and obviousness.14
 This Article offers an alternative response to the anticommons prob-
lem, to the extent that it exists, based on private ordering by market actors 
within the context of existing laws and judicial doctrines.15 The core of this 
approach is an appropriately structured operating entity—in the case of a 
DNA-on-a-chip business, this will be the entity that makes the chips. This 
entity will serve as a coordination vehicle among the team of relevant 
stakeholders, which includes IP owners; the promoter of the business, which 
                                                                                                                           
10 See id. (citing Richard A. Epstein, The Permit Power Meets the Constitution, 81 Iowa L. 
Rev. 407 (1995)). 
11 Of course, for even the best-defined property rights, transaction costs are real costs. But for 
a discussion of the many ways in which, as a practical matter, many of the transaction costs under-
lying the anticommons problem either are mitigated, rationally borne by property owners who can 
extract value by decreasing their impact on users, or empirically shown to be almost nonexistent 
due to broad classes of infringements that are simply allowed to persist, see id. at 31–36. 
12 See infra notes 13–14 and accompanying text. 
13 See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon Parchmovsky, A Marketplace for Ideas, 84 Tex. L. Rev. 
395, 412–17 (2005) (discussing liability rule treatment for IP rights); Katherine J. Strandburg, 
What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain, 2004 Wis. L. Rev. 81, 142–
46 (arguing that certain activities should be given what in effect would be free compulsory li-
cense). 
14 See generally Helen M. Berman & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Reflections on the Science and 
Law of Structural Biology, Genomics, and Drug Development, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 871 (2006). 
15 That is, we take as a given the existing laws and the government that enforces them. Our 
use of the term “private ordering” does not contemplate the total absence of government enforce-
ment of law. Rather, we use “private ordering” to refer to circumstances where parties, given ex-
tant legal and regulatory regimes, order the substance of their affairs and transactions as they see 
fit and resort to the judicial system for enforcement. 
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is likely to be an IP owner itself; and ultimately customers and other interest 
groups. The basic bargain offered to the myriad IP owners, who are the 
source of the anticommons problem, is that each owner will receive some 
financial return, some control over the operating business, and essential col-
lateral information and related business opportunities. In exchange for re-
ceiving these benefits, the IP owners will give the operating entity a limited, 
nonexclusive license to the owner’s IP. This feature of the structure speaks 
directly to the problem of excessively diffuse property rights. 
 Getting the IP owners to accept the deal offered by the promoter re-
quires that the entity be structured so that IP owners are given a meaningful 
stake in the business, which will encourage them to opt in. At the same 
time, the deal must be structured to ensure that each IP owner will have lit-
tle reason to play holdup games by opting out. Further, the structure con-
templates that the business’s customers and relevant influential interest 
groups may “shame” IP owners to participate in the enterprise by waging 
public relations campaigns on the Internet or through more traditional me-
dia outlets. 
 The core concepts supporting the proposed structure are the dual pil-
lars of coordination and self-restraint. In effect, the transaction is designed 
to incentivize IP owners to cooperate in the enterprise by credibly commit-
ting the parties to a structure that limits the potential upside for an IP owner 
if it chooses to hold out for a larger stake. The deal structure also leverages 
social and peer pressure to further encourage opting in. If it is costly to hold 
out and if doing so promises little upside, it is rational for IP owners to ex-
ercise self-restraint and not to act opportunistically, but instead to coordi-
nate their activities through the operating entity. Each IP owner gains from 
cooperating, not defecting. The coordination and self-restraint contemplated 
here allow for a private ordering solution to the anticommons problem that 
avoids some of the costs and risks of legal reform, while suggesting a num-
ber of basic policy implications for IP. 
 Such coordination and self-restraint are two issues often overlooked in 
the property literature in general, but emphasized throughout the work of 
both of the present authors.16 That is, the approach offered here follows the 
commercialization/coordination theory of IP17 that often is seen as being 
“pro-IP” and “pro-IP owners.” Here, the approach is used to show how 
those wanting access to IP can take seriously the transaction costs facing 
                                                                                                                           
16 See infra note 17. 
17 See Kieff, supra note 9, at 57–70 (exploring the coordination aspects of commercialization 
theory). See generally F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing 
Inventions, 85 Minn. L. Rev. 697 (2001) (exploring a commercialization theory of IP). 
6 Kieff & Paredes 
both IP users and IP owners in developing an entity that mitigates these 
costs in a way that benefits both groups. 
 This Article’s proposal follows the “Gilsonian” tradition of showing 
how lawyers can be helpful “transaction cost engineers” who structure 
beneficial deals to overcome obstacles.18 Lawyers are not simply pernicious 
transaction costs themselves who stand in the way of deals that otherwise 
would get done.19 Indeed, many deals would not take place without the ef-
forts of lawyers who find creative ways to bring parties together. 
 This Article proceeds as follows: Part I sketches the private ordering 
solution, paying particular attention to some of the basic hurdles it must 
overcome to have a chance of succeeding. Part II further discusses some 
complicating obstacles and limitations of the proposal, including some chal-
lenges that, although we think unlikely to occur, may be especially difficult 
to overcome if they do. Part III points out how such a private ordering solu-
tion avoids some of the risks associated with legal reform. Part IV explores 
some implications for IP theory and policy that are elucidated by the pro-
posed deal structure. 
I. Sketching the Basic Structure and Basic Hurdles 
 The Article begins by briefly summarizing the basic structure of the 
transaction, which is depicted in Figure 1. The discussion then proceeds by 
                                                                                                                           
18 See Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 
94 Yale L.J. 239, 255 (1984) (describing lawyers as “transaction cost engineers”); see also Lisa 
Bernstein, The Silicon Valley Lawyer as Transaction Cost Engineer?, 74 Or. L. Rev. 239, 241 
(1995) (further exploring Gilson’s analytical framework of the lawyer as transaction cost engineer 
and, in addition to Gilson, citing Lawrence M. Friedman et al., Law, Lawyers, and Legal Practice 
in Silicon Valley: A Preliminary Report, 64 Ind. L.J. 555, 562 (1989) (noting that “[t]he Silicon 
Valley lawyer not only works with engineers, he thinks of himself as a kind of engineer—a legal 
engineer . . . his job is to solve problems, to take a principle, a task and engineer it legally”)); 
Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 
1911, 1923 (1996) (pointing out that in addition to lawyers, “savvy investors and issuers” also 
help facilitate transactions); Curtis J. Milhaupt & Mark D. West, The Dark Side of Private Order-
ing: An Institutional and Empirical Analysis of Organized Crime, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 41, 58 (2000) 
(also using term “transaction cost engineers” for lawyers); Troy A. Paredes, A Systems Approach 
to Corporate Governance Reform: Why Importing U.S. Corporate Law Isn’t the Answer, 45 Wm. 
& Mary L. Rev. 1055, 1110–12 (2003) (exploring Gilson’s analytical framework of the lawyer as 
transaction cost engineer). 
19 See Ronald J. Gilson, Seeking Competitive Bids Versus Pure Passivity in Tender Offer De-
fense, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 51, 62–63 (1982) (“Let me start with two important elements of transaction 
costs in the acquisition setting: information costs necessary to identify the opportunity; and me-
chanical costs—for example, lawyers’, accountants’, and investment bankers’ fees—necessary to 
effect the transaction and cope with regulatory or other barriers (including defensive tactics by the 
target).”). 
 Private Ordering Solution to Anticommons 7 
unpacking the key features of the deal, including many of the basic and 
more complex hurdles it must overcome, in the rest of Part I and in Part II. 
A. Basic Structure 
 In the deal, a promoter—the impetus behind the transaction— estab-
lishes an operating entity. Most likely, the operating entity will be a limited 
liability company (“LLC”), although it might also be a limited partnership 
or a corporation. The operating entity will engage in a business, such as 
commercializing DNA-on-a-chip technology, that requires access to a 
plethora of IP rights. It is anticipated that the relevant universe of IP owners 
will grant the operating entity a limited, nonexclusive license of the relevant 
IP.20 Assuming the operating entity is an LLC, then each licensor-IP owner 
will receive a membership interest in the LLC.21 Each licensor-IP owner’s 
equity interest in the operating entity will entitle it to some financial return, 
as well as some control over the entity through voting rights. As a result of 
participating in the enterprise, we expect that each licensor-IP owner also 
will receive valuable information and will benefit from complementary 
sales and other business opportunities that arise from being involved in the 
                                                                                                                           
20 It is recognized that the key to avoiding the anticommons problem is getting this license 
granting to occur with a high degree of predictability and certainty. To help the reader understand 
the basic structure of the deal we are proposing, we provide an overview here and then discuss the 
more complex reasoning throughout the remainder of Part I and in Part II. 
21 If the operating entity is a limited partnership, the licensor-IP owners will receive a limited 
partnership interest; and if the operating entity is a corporation, the licensor-IP owners will receive 
shares of stock. 
The transaction contemplates that the membership interests, limited partnership interests, and 
shares of stock will be placed in private offerings and thus not subject to the registration require-
ments of the federal Securities Act of 1933. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2000). That said, if there are 
500 or more licensor-IP owners, the operating entity may have to comply with various require-
ments under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”). 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78mm 
(2000). To avoid Exchange Act requirements, it might be necessary to have more than one operat-
ing entity, each of which would have fewer than 500 licensor-IP owners as members, limited part-
ners, or shareholders. Alternatively, it might be possible to structure the transaction to include 
several pass-through “licensing entities.” Each licensing entity would be a licensee of the licensor-
IP owners. The licensing entities in turn would relicense the IP rights to the operating entity and 
would be the members, limited partners, or shareholders of the operating entity. This two-tiered 
structure contemplates that there would be fewer than 500 licensing entities to avoid Exchange Act 
obligations for the operating entity. This all having been said, the membership interests (in the 
case of an LLC) and the limited partnership interests (in the case of a limited partnership) might 
not constitute securities under the federal securities laws if the licensor-IP owners exert sufficient 
control over the operating entity. Neither the Securities Act of 1933 nor the Exchange Act would 
apply to such nonsecurities. If the operating entity were a corporation, the shares of stock it issues 
would be securities regardless of how much control the licensor-IP owners exerted. See generally 
Louis Loss & Joel Seligman, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 82–87, 354–70, 435–44 (4th 
ed. 2000). 
8 Kieff & Paredes 
enterprise. The promoter will receive similar financial and other benefits, 
and, as a practical matter, likely will have the most control over most as-
pects of the entity. 
 We anticipate that the financial, informational, and other gains from 
engaging in the enterprise will induce many, if not most or even all, IP own-
ers to opt in to the deal. But the structure allows that peer pressure among IP 
owners, as well as social pressure from the operating entity’s customers and 
other interest groups, also will encourage IP owners to participate. The 
structure, though, accommodates the possibility that some IP owners will 
opt out.22
Figure 1: Basic Organizational Chart 
IP Owners
Operating Entity
Customers
Products & Services
Money
Social Pressure
Limited, Nonexclusive
License of the IP
Voting Power
Money
Information 
Complementary Sales
Peer Pressure
Promoter
Resources
Other Business Opportunities
 
                                                                                                                           
22 An IP owner that does not opt in might not be holding out strategically for more value, but 
might simply have a reasonable and good faith preference not to participate in the enterprise at all. 
In some cases, there might be no way to have structured the deal to entice such an IP owner to 
participate. Some IP owners, for example, might want to “go it alone” or might have other busi-
ness opportunities on which they prefer to focus, notwithstanding that the operating entity only 
requires a limited, nonexclusive license of the IP. Some IP owners, however, might have been 
persuaded to opt in if the deal were structured differently. Accordingly, to maximize the number of 
IP owners who find the opportunity attractive, the promoter might wish to consult various IP own-
ers early to get a sense of how best to structure the enterprise, including acceptable royalties, gov-
ernance, and business operations. 
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B. Basic Hurdles: Unpacking the Structure 
 For the proposed approach to work, it must overcome at least a core set 
of basic hurdles that businesspeople and their advisors routinely address in 
structuring deals. First, the entity must be attractive to rational actors focus-
ing on their financial payoffs. That is, the deal must be financially profit-
able. Second, parties sometimes behave irrationally and typically behave 
strategically. Recognizing that people respond to more than financial pay-
offs, the transaction contemplates that reputational sanctions may induce IP 
owners to opt in when otherwise they might behave opportunistically by 
holding out for a larger financial stake, even if it jeopardizes the deal. Third, 
the collective action that the operating entity is designed to facilitate must 
withstand antitrust scrutiny. Fourth, the entity must generally be seen as 
socially constructive to mitigate the risk that courts, administrative agen-
cies, or legislatures will not tolerate it. 
 In the discussions that follow, each obstacle will be addressed in turn 
and related back to the feature of the deal that responds to it. Each deal 
component is shown to be loosely analogous to an existing business ar-
rangement. These analogies are offered as helpful examples to illustrate 
some key aspects of the suggested approach. For this reason, they are nec-
essarily abbreviated and stylized summaries intended only to highlight par-
ticular characteristics of what in the real world are of course highly complex 
and nuanced arrangements. That is, the accounts of these loosely analogous 
arrangements are not offered as complete accounts in their own right, but 
merely as points of comparison to highlight especially salient aspects of the 
proposed transaction. 
 Before going further a final caveat about the precise scope of the pre-
sent project must be noted. The goal of this Article is to suggest a new ap-
proach, not to prove or warrant that it will work. As with any new business 
model, the first step is to explain what it is, how it generally will operate, 
why it should be considered, and what some major obstacles may be. As 
with any new business model, the precise contours and details of any ver-
sion of the structure that is implemented necessarily will be left to the deals 
that actually get struck in practice. These are beyond the scope of the pre-
sent project, which is limited to providing an initial sketch of the structure 
that lawyers, investment bankers, and businesspeople could use as a starting 
point in doing a real deal. Also, as with any new business model, only ac-
tual decisions by agencies, courts, and legislators will show how well the 
transaction will be received by the legal and political processes. Legal and 
regulatory risks are always present. 
10 Kieff & Paredes 
1. Hurdle One: Limited Liability and Financial Payoffs 
 The first hurdle for the proposed entity to overcome is that it must be 
structured so that it has at least prima facie appeal to rational actors. The 
key question explored here, therefore, is how to get a huge and diffuse set 
of rational IP owners focusing on their financial payoffs to elect to give the 
operating entity sufficient permission to operate so that investment in the 
entity’s operation by the promoter and other members of the team, such as 
employees and creditors, is worthwhile. The answer, discussed more fully 
below, is tied to limited liability in two fundamental respects. First, limited 
liability mitigates the risk that the promoter and the IP owners will be per-
sonally liable for any debts or obligations of the operating entity. Second, 
limited liability helps ensure that the operating entity does not have a “hos-
tage” (for example, substantial retained earnings) that an IP owner choosing 
to hold out can go after. 
 The anticommons problem stems from the need to obtain a nonexclu-
sive license from each of the pertinent IP owners to engage at least in the 
limited use needed to conduct the desired line of business. For example, the 
need to obtain such licenses is implicated in the production of a diagnostic 
chip containing thousands of patented DNA sequences. The literature 
stresses the transaction costs and the seeming waste in identifying, finding, 
and then successfully transacting with such a staggering number of individ-
ual IP owners, especially in the face of the risk that any one could hold out 
and compromise the entire effort after search and negotiation costs associ-
ated with many of the others have been incurred.23 The wasteful costs asso-
ciated with transacting over these IP rights are particularly troubling where, 
as is likely the case for a diagnostic DNA chip, no additional know-how or 
even materials are needed from the IP owner because they are readily avail-
able from the public domain. Therefore, the crux of the problem lies in the 
nature of the IP right itself, which is the right to exclude others from using 
the subject matter covered by that IP right. Put differently, the problem is 
seen as being only about freedom to operate, rather than about the need to 
obtain other goods or services. 
 Because the IP owner’s right to exclude is backed up ultimately by its 
right to sue an infringer to obtain damages, to obtain damages enhanced by 
attorney fees and potential trebling, as well as to obtain an outright injunc-
tion, the ultimate driver of the anticommons effect appears to be the credi-
ble threat of countless lawsuits. But familiar notions of limited liability have 
long operated, indeed by design, precisely to make business investments 
                                                                                                                           
23 See generally Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 1; Heller, supra note 1. 
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more attractive notwithstanding the threat of lawsuits. A business structure 
that could operate in the face of such a threat offers at least a starting point 
for a potential solution to the anticommons problem in certain cases. 
 Thus, the first step in the proposed structure involves setting up the 
new business within a distinct limited liability entity, such as a separate lim-
ited liability company, limited partnership, or corporation.24 Because of the 
flexibility it affords the parties, an LLC would probably be the preferred 
entity form. Limited liability for a firm’s equity holders and other stake-
holders will provide an incentive to invest in the entity despite the threat of 
countless lawsuits by IP owners. Although it may seem unattractive to in-
vest in an entity that may face countless lawsuits, many firms operate in the 
face of possibly countless claims. For example, Dow Corning has continued 
to operate in the face of myriad litigations involving its breast implant busi-
ness;25 numerous companies, such as Halliburton, continue to operate in the 
face of seemingly endless asbestos litigation;26 Merck continues to research 
and develop pharmaceuticals notwithstanding being tied up in countless 
                                                                                                                           
24 For more on limited liability, see, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited 
Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 89, 105–06 (1985); Timothy P. Glynn, Beyond 
“Unlimiting” Shareholder Liability: Vicarious Tort Liability for Corporate Officers, 57 Vand. L. 
Rev. 329, 336–43 (2004); Henry G. Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 
53 Va. L. Rev. 259, 261–65 (1967); Robert B. Thompson, Unpacking Limited Liability: Direct and 
Vicarious Liability of Corporate Participants for Torts of the Enterprise, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 1, 6–10 
(1994). See generally Joseph A. Grundfest, The Limited Future of Unlimited Liability: A Capital 
Markets Perspective, 102 Yale L.J. 387 (1992); Paul Halpern et al., An Economic Analysis of Lim-
ited Liability in Corporation Law, 30 U. Toronto L.J. 117 (1980); Henry Hansmann & Reinier 
Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 Yale L.J. 1879 
(1991); David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 1565 
(1991). 
For a discussion of the related topic of judgment proofing, see generally Lynn M. LoPucki, 
The Death of Liability, 106 Yale L.J. 1 (1996); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Essential Structure of 
Judgment Proofing, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 147 (1998); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Irrefutable Logic of Judg-
ment Proofing: A Reply to Professor Schwarcz, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 55 (1999); Lynn M. LoPucki, 
Virtual Judgment Proofing: A Rejoinder, 107 Yale L.J. 1413 (1998); Charles W. Mooney, Jr., 
Judgment Proofing, Bankruptcy Policy, and the Dark Side of Tort Liability, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 73 
(1999); Steven L. Schwarcz, The Inherent Irrationality of Judgment Proofing, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 1 
(1999); Steven L. Schwarcz, Judgment Proofing: A Rejoinder, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 77 (1999); Steven 
Shavell, The Judgment Proof Problem, 6 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 45 (1986); James J. White, Corpo-
rate Judgment Proofing: A Response to Lynn LoPucki’s The Death of Liability, 107 Yale L.J. 1363 
(1998). For a discussion of these issues by the present authors in a different context, see F. Scott 
Kieff & Troy A. Paredes, An Approach to Intellectual Property, Bankruptcy, and Corporate Con-
trol, 82 Wash. U. L.Q. 1313, 1331–38 (2004). 
25 See Press Release, Dow Corning Corp., Dow Corning Emerges from Chapter 11 on June 1, 
2004 (June 1, 2004), available at http://www.dowcorning.com/content/news/pr_ 
chapter11emergence.asp?DCWS=&DCWSS= (describing Dow Corning’s financial recovery from 
the breast implant litigation). 
26 See Halliburton, Asbestos Primer, http://www.halliburton.com/ir/asbestos_primerjsp (last vis-
ited Nov. 9, 2006). 
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lawsuits over Vioxx;27 and the tobacco companies have not gone out of 
business. In each of these instances, despite the spectre of costly litigation, 
the businesses presently are operating in a way that generates gains for each 
of the firm’s constituencies: shareholders, managers, laborers, business 
creditors, and customers. Put differently, the combination of the limited li-
ability of the corporate form with the nonfraudulent transfers of dividends, 
salary, debt service, and customer support makes their business activity 
worth pursuing, even in the face of so many lawsuits. The basic purpose of 
these analogies is to instantiate how a business can operate in a way that 
benefits stakeholders even when facing the risk of a set of impending claims 
that could put the enterprise out of business. 
 But perhaps more important for present purposes is the flip side of this 
limited liability coin—specifically, the proposed structure leverages the veil 
of limited liability to help ensure that the IP owners eventually are con-
strained and choose cooperation over defection when facing such a business 
by making it considerably more likely that the operating entity will not have 
an interest in a potential hostage that is worth it to an IP owner to threaten. 
Put differently, a basic challenge of the deal is to dissuade IP owners from 
holding out for a larger piece of the pie. This is always a concern when par-
ties bargain. We take up this issue more in Part II, but we stress one point 
here: the operating entity could be financed and run in a way so that it has 
few assets, which helps ensure that the benefits for an IP holder of opting in 
exceed the potential gains from holding out. 
 The structure contemplates that any profits the operating entity enjoys 
will regularly be distributed to the promoter and licensor-IP owners, leaving 
few profits in the entity. Consequently, an IP owner that holds out will only 
find a small pool of assets that it can tap into in a successful infringement 
action. And the corporate veil of limited liability will go a long way toward 
ensuring, although without absolutely guaranteeing, that the suing IP owner 
cannot pierce through the entity to go after the assets of the promoter or the 
participating IP owners.28 Indeed, businesses regularly “judgment proof” 
                                                                                                                           
27 See Press Release, Merck & Co., Merck Updates Status of VIOXX Litigation and SEC In-
quiry (Jan. 28, 2005), available at http://www.merck.com/newsroom/press_releases/ 
corporate/2005_0128.html. 
28 For more on veil piercing, see generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing LLC Veil 
Piercing, 2005 U. Ill. L. Rev. 77; Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil Piercing, 26 J. Corp. L. 
479 (2001); Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 Cornell L. 
Rev. 1036 (1991). 
In addition, in the face of adverse judgments against it for infringement, the operating entity’s 
willingness and ability to file bankruptcy may leave little if any value for holdout-IP owners that 
successfully sue. 
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themselves in this fashion, and courts routinely respect such corporate 
structuring. 
 More to the point, the entity could be run to make sure that the existing 
claims on its future gross receipts come as close as possible to approximat-
ing their value. For example, those participating in the entity, including the 
promoter itself, may have claims in the form of ordinary employment com-
pensation or other contract pay, such as consulting fees or factory-line rental 
fees, aside from their equity stake. Simply recharacterizing profits as some 
form of contract payment (wage, rent, etc.) as a way of “zeroing out” the 
operating entity may still leave an available hostage for a holdout. But con-
cessions would be required from the recipients of these wage, rental, and 
similar payments to release these funds for payment to a holdout. In addi-
tion, once made, such payments to the promoter or certain licensor-IP own-
ers should be further out of reach of a creditor (such as a holdout having a 
judgment for infringement in its favor) than distributions of the operating 
entity’s profits. Moreover, claimants to the operating entity’s profits may be 
third parties. In that case, any required concessions would be particularly 
difficult to obtain to release funds to pay a holdout to opt in; and any sort of 
piercing the corporate veil doctrine or broad theory of substantive consoli-
dation should not bring payments to such third parties within the reach of an 
IP holdout. Further, the operating entity may be emboldened in refusing any 
holdout’s demands because reneging on the operating entity’s wage and 
contract terms with third parties could have serious reputational conse-
quences for the enterprise.29  
 Because the operating entity is likely to be new rather than established, 
initial financing presumably will be needed, such as for various capital assets 
including real estate and equipment. Appropriately structured financing with 
debt, as opposed to equity, can further decrease the potential hostage threat to 
the owners of the operating entity while at the same time decreasing the direct 
benefit available to an IP owner wanting to sue for infringement. Not only 
does the use of debt ensure there is a preexisting claim against the entity’s 
cash flow, but the use of a security interest in the operating entity’s underly-
ing assets—be they plant, equipment, real estate, inventory, or receivables—
would both protect the creditor and decrease the resources available to satisfy 
a judgment in favor of a holdout. Additionally, the operating entity can ensure 
                                                                                                                           
29 To be sure, the operating entity’s interest in using revenues to make such payments can 
trigger its own hostage effect in at least two ways. First, the revenues themselves may be attractive 
to a holdout as a source of direct financial benefit that can be taken. Second, the revenues can be 
blocked from reaching the parties to which the operating entity owes money in a way that will 
cause a negative reputational effect for the operating entity if the holdout successfully obtains an 
injunction. 
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that it does not own any substantial assets by simply renting what it needs for 
the business. For example, to the extent established factories owned by others 
often are not in continuous use, such excess capacity may be rented. Indeed, 
such foundry services are a big business in the modern electronics industry.30 
The business renting these resources to the operating entity may or may not 
be related to the operating entity—that is, the lessor may be the promoter, an 
IP owner, or some third party.31
 To deprive a holdout of a possible hostage to target, the operating en-
tity also can keep its overall revenue stream low by, for example, offering 
the DNA chip at a low price. Although such a pricing strategy decreases the 
hostage effect, it does not compromise what likely are key benefits for par-
ticipating IP owners and the promoter—namely, the informational benefits 
and derivative business opportunities discussed below. To the contrary, set-
ting a low price should encourage wider use of the DNA chip and might be 
a good public relations strategy for the enterprise and its constituencies. 
This could feed back into more social and peer pressure being brought to 
bear on holdouts, encouraging them to opt in. Any hostage risk posed by the 
informational and derivative business benefits would be mitigated by the 
fact that the holdout would be denying itself access to such benefits if it 
were to shut down the operating entity. 
 Although a strategy of keeping financial profits low seems counterin-
tuitive, such a strategy may be key to reducing the holdout risk by denying 
a potential holdout a hostage that it can take for bargaining leverage. Even 
if some participants in the operating entity preferred a more traditional 
                                                                                                                           
30 See Norm Alster, Investing: Considering Chip Shares? Look for Plant Owners, N.Y. Times, 
Feb. 1, 2004, § 3, at 36. 
31 We are designating as the “promoter” the person—human being or legal person like a busi-
ness—who basically organizes the operating entity in the first instance. This person may be an IP 
owner or someone interested in complementary business activities. It is imaginable that instead of 
being a for-profit, private sector business the promoter is a government agency, a nongovernmen-
tal organization, or a university. Our intuition, though, is that others are more likely to participate 
in the enterprise if the promoter is a for-profit, private sector person than if it is a government 
entity or a non-profit organization, because the promoter’s for-profit, private sector status is likely 
to give it a more open and predictable agenda as a business partner. We also think that, for society 
as a whole, it will be better for the promoter to be a for-profit, private sector person because we 
think that the market’s price system is generally better at deciding which deals should be done, 
although we of course recognize that this is open to debate. Put differently, we would prefer that 
the actual stakeholders—promoter, IP owners, employees, creditors, and customers—make the 
decisions, not political players or bureaucrats. 
It should also be noted that in structuring the deal, the promoter’s interests have to be taken 
into account. Initiating and operating the DNA-on-a-chip business will require nontrivial amounts 
of money, skill, time, etc. In exchange, the promoter will want cash, kudos, control, etc. How 
much of each of these the promoter gets will be a function of how the transaction transpires in 
practice. 
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profit maximization strategy, the marginal benefit of generating a larger 
profit and more free cash flow may not be sufficiently attractive when com-
pared to the added risk this creates by offering a more attractive hostage to a 
holdout. Thus, the choice of low profits and few IP owner holdouts is pref-
erable to high profits and a substantial risk of holdouts and infringement 
lawsuits.32
 The combined effect of these steps should lead to a business entity that 
has a narrow and shallow pool of assets and, if desired, a net income stream 
that is not much more than a trickle. To keep potential litigants at bay, the 
entity is designed to be simultaneously unappealing as a litigation target and 
appealing as a business partner. 
 In fact, the operating entity has its own ability to threaten hostages in a 
way that can exert leverage over IP owners. The key to a patent owner’s 
value is the credible threat of an infringement suit, and obtaining a final 
court judgment of infringement can be significantly stalled, if not pre-
vented, for almost any patent today if the patent is placed into reexamina-
tion before the Patent Office. Thus, the operating entity can threaten to 
place into reexamination any patent owned by a holdout.33 Putting a hold-
out’s patent into reexamination would cost the operating entity very little 
and, in effect, would likely tie up the patent in the Patent Office for several 
years, interfering with any enforcement or licensing efforts by the IP owner. 
 It is not enough just to create a disincentive to sue for infringement. 
For the operating entity to be appealing as a business partner to the IP own-
ers, the IP owners must enjoy a real upside from opting in. The entity must 
announce a set of “rules” (deal terms) that offer every potential claimant 
                                                                                                                           
32 The opt in / hold out decision facing each IP owner is itself a game among the IP owners, 
not just a game between the IP owners on the one hand and the promoter on the other. While each 
holdout may stand to gain a considerable amount if it were the only holdout, the potential value of 
holding out decreases as the number of holdouts increases. This description recalls a classic pris-
oner’s dilemma. Cf. Doug Lichtman, Patent Holdouts in the Standard-Setting Process 2–3, 10–12 
(Univ. of Chi. John M. Olin Program in Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 292, 2006), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=902646 (arguing that with many potential holdouts in a standard-setting 
process, the incentive of each IP owner to sue is diminished). 
33 For a discussion of the modern reexamination system, including the reasons it can be 
viewed as placing a large cloud over all patents in a socially undesirable manner, see F. Scott 
Kieff, The Case for Registering Patents and the Law and Economics of Present Patent-Obtaining 
Rules, 45 B.C. L. Rev. 55, 115–18 (2003) (discussing the public choice problems with modern 
reexamination proceedings). The theoretical concerns about reexamination have been borne out in 
the recent proceedings over the patent asserted against the Blackberry service. See Pat-
ents/Reexamination: NTP Charges Misconduct in PTO’s Review of Patents in Blackberry Dispute, 
72 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. 52, 52–53 (2006) (discussing the many ways in which the in-
fringer in that case brought improper political pressure and gained improper access to secret Patent 
Office proceedings as tools for holding the patentee’s patent hostage during litigation and settle-
ment proceedings). 
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who might otherwise sue for infringement the option to bring its own bona 
fide straw—albeit only a narrow one—to come drink from the entity’s asset 
pool. That is, every IP owner with a potential bona fide claim for infringe-
ment must be offered a chance to receive a modest royalty payment in ex-
change for granting a license to the operating entity. This might be through 
a separate licensing arrangement or, more likely, through the structure of the 
entity itself. For example, if the proposed entity is an LLC, each IP owner 
could be granted a membership interest in the entity, with a right to partici-
pate in the entity’s profits, in exchange for granting the entity a license. Us-
ing a separate licensing arrangement suffers from one particular disadvan-
tage—namely, it leaves open the possibility that the promoter will have to 
engage in one-off negotiations with each IP owner. This matters because it 
creates numerous bilateral bargaining situations in which an IP owner can 
threaten holding out if it does not receive a larger piece of the pie (or, to 
mix metaphors, a bigger straw). Alternatively, the promoter could offer the 
LLC agreement for the operating entity to all IP owners on a take-it-or-
leave-it basis with each IP owner’s stake in the business represented by its 
membership interest in the LLC. This second approach credibly commits the 
promoter to a predetermined deal with the IP owners that is not open to re-
negotiation. Essentially, the promoter takes off the table the prospect of giv-
ing IP owners different deals if they all must sign up to the entity’s LLC 
agreement, an agreement that the promoter cannot realistically go back and 
restructure.34
 The precise terms governing IP owner royalties may take several 
forms. For example, because early certainty will be important to all con-
stituencies, a higher amount may be offered to those who self-identify early, 
providing an incentive to do so. 
 In addition to the direct financial return the IP owners enjoy in ex-
change for granting limited, nonexclusive licenses to the operating entity, 
the IP owners also will have the opportunity to exercise at least some con-
trol by participating in the entity’s governance. This will give the IP owners 
a different type of ownership in the operating entity than money: the right to 
participate in its decision making. Exactly how much influence the IP own-
ers will have as compared to the promoter is an important deal term that 
will have to be negotiated within the context of each transaction. Such man-
agement questions are not unique or intractable, though. Governance has to 
be dealt with in nearly all deals. 
 Aside from the profit interest licensor-IP owners will enjoy, participa-
tion in the operating entity also should generate substantial indirect benefits 
                                                                                                                           
34 For more, see infra notes 69–73 and accompanying text. 
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for the IP owners, providing further incentive for IP owners to opt in, even 
if, as suggested above, the entity’s financial profits are kept low. It is quite 
possible that these indirect benefits will be much larger economically than 
the IP owner’s direct financial benefits from the operating entity’s business. 
For example, in the case of a DNA-on-a-chip business, each participating IP 
owner presumably will learn a great deal of information that will meaning-
fully help it derive financial benefit from other uses of its IP. The main pur-
pose of technologies like DNA-on-a-chip is that such technologies allow a 
large, seemingly homogeneous population to be segmented into distinct 
subpopulations. By giving the chip venture a limited, nonexclusive license 
to include its particular DNA segment on the chip, the owner of a patent on 
that DNA segment will at a minimum learn which subpopulations are inter-
ested in its DNA segment and may gain insight into new uses for the DNA 
segment.35 The licensor-IP owner or its other business partners will then be 
able to derive financial returns from a business model that uses the DNA 
segment to further treat or diagnose that subpopulation or for other uses that 
come to light as a result of having participated in the operating entity.36 In 
short, licensor-IP owners likely will benefit from additional business oppor-
tunities that are derivative of their decision to opt in to the structure we pro-
pose. 
 To summarize, the upside for IP owners and the promoter is that the 
deal gets done, which generates some financial gains from the operating 
entity’s business for the IP owners and the promoter, but which also gener-
ates useful information for IP owners that may be exploited in other busi-
ness ventures. The deal may also generate useful information and business 
opportunities for the promoter, which itself may contribute IP to the enter-
prise. The incentive to opt in is coupled with a disincentive for IP owners to 
hold out. One key to dissuading IP owners from holding out is to structure 
the deal so that there is no meaningful available hostage for a holdout to 
take. At a minimum, the assets and free cash flow the operating entity has 
available to satisfy any judgment against it in favor of an IP owner suing for 
infringement must be sufficiently small so that the transaction costs an IP 
owner incurs in attempting to appropriate such value makes litigation un-
economical. 
                                                                                                                           
35 The license given by the IP owners to the operating entity only needs to be nonexclusive 
and limited to the entity’s particular business model, because that is all the entity needs to operate. 
At the same time, this preserves the ability for the IP owners to extract value from other business 
ventures, including other iterations of the type of entity proposed here. 
36 These are similar to the benefits that the Google Library Project offers to IP owners. See in-
fra notes 55–63 and accompanying text (discussing the Google Library Project). 
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 The limited pool of operating entity net assets, particularly if combined 
with a limited trickle of net income, impacts an IP owner’s payoffs. The IP 
owners that arrive with a straw in hand to drink from the pool of the operat-
ing entity’s assets and income stream will face a relatively straightforward 
payoff choice. They can either use the straw to take a sip or they can sue 
and net little to nothing. That said, the operating entity need not be a finan-
cial failure to achieve this result, and in fact may do quite well. It is simply 
that the resources an IP owner can expect to appropriate by holding out 
need only be exceeded by the financial and other costs of litigation for IP 
owners to rationally elect to opt out of litigation and in to the entity. A suit 
for enhanced damages will not increase the resources the entity has avail-
able for the IP owner. It simply will mean that the IP owner has a larger un-
satisfied judgment. In addition, a suit for an injunction will only cut off 
whatever operating entity income the IP owner was otherwise hoping to 
participate in by successfully suing for infringement. 
 Our intuition is that the above structure provides sufficient reasons to 
anticipate that many IP owners will opt in. We believe that many of those 
not opting in having gotten this far in the analysis ultimately will opt in for 
reasons explored below in Part I.B.2.37 We also recognize that a 100% opt-
in rate is not likely to be possible in every case, nor is it likely to be needed 
in any. 
 Accomplishing the proposed deal will itself entail transaction costs. 
Transaction costs associated with bargaining over IP rights are always to 
some extent shared between the IP owner on the one hand and the potential 
infringer/assignee/licensee on the other. In the proposed structure, many 
transaction costs will be borne by the IP owners. More particularly, many of 
the ongoing costs of identifying and finding the deal partner are borne by 
the IP owners because the operating entity can use those DNA segments for 
which it obtains permission and avoid those for which it does not. In other 
words, once the promoter advertises the transaction to the community of IP 
owners, IP owners will have an incentive to self-identify in order to enjoy 
the benefits of participating in the enterprise. This is particularly true when 
it becomes evident that remaining unknown and waiting to sue for in-
fringement later promises a holdout no net upside. The costs incurred by the 
promoter will primarily stem from setting up the structure in a way that, as 
described throughout this Article, provides incentives for IP owners to come 
to and opt in to the enterprise. Also, there surely will be ongoing transaction 
costs borne by all parties as the operating entity conducts its business. 
                                                                                                                           
37 One can never say that there is absolutely zero risk of a lawsuit for infringement, but we 
believe the proposed structure reduces the risk considerably. 
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 The entity—or, more likely, the promoter—also can adopt a variety of 
strategies to mitigate transaction costs. Representative examples include 
some of the relatively new strategies generally available through the Inter-
net. For example, the entire deal could be advertised, and even largely con-
summated, by the use of a thorough and interactive set of Web pages. The 
pages would exchange information and facilitate bargaining between the 
promoter and the IP owners long before the operating entity begins to oper-
ate. Just like the Apple iTunes business is conducted on the Web to issue 
vast numbers of IP licenses in exchange for receiving small payments from 
each customer,38 the operating entity could operate a Web page that is es-
sentially the reverse model, in which vast numbers of IP licenses are re-
ceived from a large population of IP owners in exchange for giving royalties 
or a membership interest in the LLC. 
 At bottom, the entity will operate by facilitating coordination among 
the many IP owners by binding them to a set of rules resulting in a high de-
gree of self-restraint from opportunistic behavior. At least this is the case if 
all decisions are informed and rational. To help ensure that they are in-
formed, the promoter must take great strides to advertise the strategy. Little 
can be done, however, to eliminate the inevitable human frailties that render 
individuals only boundedly rational. For example, there is always the possi-
bility that an IP owner will dig in and irrationally commit itself to a negotia-
tion strategy in which the owner refuses to recognize the financial folly of 
holding out. Plus, individuals often get emotional in negotiations. We even 
allow that some rational IP owners may simply believe that opting out even-
tually will result in a bigger payoff, notwithstanding the attempt to structure 
the deal so that is not the case. 
2. Hurdle Two: Behavioralism and Peer and Social Pressure 
 It is recognized that structuring the financial payoffs that IP owners 
face so that it is rational for them to opt in does not mean that they all will. 
People are not perfectly rational, and a holdout IP owner may not be con-
vinced that the promoter and the other IP owners are unwilling or unable to 
deliver additional value to avoid the holdout. Moreover, an individual who 
perceives an act of infringement— threatened or actual—against his or her 
IP is likely to be even less rational and more emotional than otherwise. The 
combined use of peer and social pressure may help cabin any resulting 
holdout behavior that arises by appealing to different sensibilities of the 
holdout IP owner than direct financial payoffs do. 
                                                                                                                           
38 See Apple iTunes Homepage, http://www.apple.com/itunes/overview (last visited Nov. 8, 
2006). 
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 For the entity proposed here, any one IP owner’s decision to hold out 
would frustrate not only all of the other thousands of IP owners who have 
opted in. Holdouts also would compromise the well-being of the vast patient 
population who would be potential customers of the business and who would 
hope to obtain their important medical screening information. Consequently, 
the operating entity need not be left to fend for itself on the battlefield as the 
target of a dispute waged by an IP owner who opts out. Because of the stakes 
facing the other members of the production team, some of whom are peers of 
the holdout IP owner and others of whom are sympathetic patients, the oper-
ating entity itself can take steps to help ensure that these different constituen-
cies are sufficiently informed of the problems wrought by holdouts so that 
they themselves will take on the battle against the holdout IP owner. One 
could imagine licensor-IP owners pressing holdouts to participate in the busi-
ness. One also could imagine patient groups and organizations such as the 
American Cancer Society waging some form of public relations campaign 
through the Internet or traditional media exhorting holdout IP owners to opt 
in. The promoter could also take steps to inflict reputational harm on hold-
outs. In short, holdouts may be shamed into joining the enterprise.39
 To the extent that a holdout is at all “other regarding,” simply appeal-
ing to the holdout’s sense of “right” and “wrong” may sway an IP owner to 
opt in to be part of a positive effort to improve the health and welfare of 
people, especially where the stakes may be life and death, instead of being 
an obstacle to such progress.40
 The operating entity, and by extension the promoter, may also be sub-
ject to social pressure similar to that on a holdout IP owner. If so, the oper-
ating entity, as well as the promoter, could claim to be caught in the middle 
when dealing with holdouts in a way that may shift the tenor of the negotia-
tions. For example, in negotiating with a holdout, the operating entity’s 
management can draw on the public’s expressed desire for the DNA chip in 
urging the holdout to agree to opt in. 
 The type of peer and social pressure contemplated here is somewhat 
analogous to the peer and social pressure that has been at play in the serial 
                                                                                                                           
39 For discussions of shaming in a related context, see Paredes, supra note 18, at 1086–92. 
See generally David A. Skeel, Jr., Corporate Shaming Revisited: An Essay for Bill Klein, 2 Berke-
ley Bus. L.J. 105 (2005); David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1811 
(2001). 
40 For more on other-regarding behavior, sometimes referred to simply as altruism, see gener-
ally Lynn A. Stout, Other-Regarding Preferences and Social Norms (Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. 
2001 Working Paper Series in Bus., Econ. & Regulatory Policy, Working Paper No. 265902, 
2001), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=265902. 
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bankruptcies—or near bankruptcies—facing modern airlines.41 Rather than 
being disputes that are entirely characterized as management (or capital) 
against labor, the financial turmoil facing airlines has often involved efforts 
by one labor group to hold out in a way that threatens the interests of share-
holders, creditors, management, other labor groups, and customers.42 In an 
employee-owned company like United Airlines,43 when a union holds out in 
labor negotiations, it threatens the interests of all employees in their role as 
shareholders, as well as in their role as employees hoping for continued 
employment. Ticketed customers are an additional important population of 
potentially adversely impacted individuals who can provide broader social 
pressure against a holdout labor group. When faced with a holdout, a com-
pany’s only realistic options often are to permanently replace striking work-
ers to the extent the law and labor markets allow, or to bow to the holdout 
union to the disadvantage of other stakeholders, particularly if caving jeop-
ardizes the firm’s long-term financial viability.44 Neither seems particularly 
attractive to the airline’s other stakeholders. This, then, creates the potential 
for a formidable combination of both peer and social pressure on each indi-
vidual labor group not to hold out and strike lest it trigger outrage and frus-
tration on the part of other employees and customers.45
                                                                                                                           
41 See, e.g., Susan Carey, United Lobbies for More Savings from Its Unions—Airline Says 
Concessions Must Reach $2.4 Billion to Preserve Operations, Wall St. J., Dec. 16, 2002, at A2 
(discussing cyclical nature of these bankruptcy proceedings in which first one labor group and 
then another threatens to hold out); Amy Merrick, Northwest Pilots Vote to Reopen Contract Talks, 
Wall St. J., Sept. 2, 2005, at A10 (same). 
42 For example, after its mechanics’ union went on strike in August 2005, Northwest Airlines 
suffered a drop in efficiency from pilots and flight attendants still working but unwilling to coop-
erate with replacement workers. See Jeremy W. Peters & Micheline Maynard, The Replacement 
Mechanics: $27 an Hour and Some Choice Words from Northwest Strikers, N.Y. Times, Aug. 24, 
2005, at C1. 
43 During United’s 1994 financial crisis, the airline reimbursed employees for their compensa-
tion concessions with fifty-five percent of the stock in parent company UAL and control of the 
company. See Greg Burns et al., United’s Undoing: A War Within, Chi. Trib., July 13, 2003, at 1. A 
later deal in 2002 took control from employees when other concessions were not sufficient to 
rescue the company. See Susan Carey, Leading the News: UAL Workers Lose Majority Rights as 
Stake Declines, Wall St. J., Mar. 10, 2003, at A3. 
44 Northwest Airlines permanently replaced nearly two thousand striking mechanics in August 
2005 as its other unions did not support the labor action. See Micheline Maynard & Jeremy W. 
Peters, Northwest Keeps Flying as Its Mechanics Strike, N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 2005, § 1, at 18. 
45 See, e.g., Micheline Maynard & Jeremy W. Peters, Northwest Airlines Threatens to Replace 
Strikers Permanently, N.Y. Times, Aug. 26, 2005, at C3 (explaining that certain Northwest unions 
were critical of the non-AFL-CIO mechanics’ union’s refusal to permit a vote on the proposed 
contract to take place and that these unions expressed that they were agreeable to allowing perma-
nent replacement workers for the mechanics); Jeremy W. Peters & Micheline Maynard, Head of 
Mechanics’ Union Reassures Airline Strikers, N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 2005, at C3 (reporting that 
during the Northwest mechanics’ strike, other Northwest unions did not support the mechanics, 
including the withdrawal of an invitation to the mechanics); Melanie Trottman, Pilots’ Talks with 
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 To be sure, the combination of the efforts to deter rational, as well as 
irrational and emotional, holdouts may still be insufficient to deter all hold-
outs. In such cases, the proposed DNA-on-a-chip business approach can sim-
ply omit the sequences covered by the IP rights owned by those who do not 
opt in.46 To the extent that the total number of sequences covered by the set 
of IP rights that the operating entity can use remains large, the business will 
be producing a chip of significant use. So long as the DNA chip has consider-
able use, there is still reason for the operating entity to move forward, not-
withstanding that DNA sequences are “missing” because of some holdouts. 
That said, to the extent that the marginal use from including a holdout’s IP is 
sufficiently valuable, the participating IP owners, as well as patients and their 
advocates, will have an interest in pressuring any holdouts to opt in. Simply 
put, although the DNA chip is not “all or nothing,” the more DNA sequences 
the chip has, the better. In most cases, it is likely that the operating entity will 
be able to derive a sufficient benefit from having a large number of participants 
so that excluding some will not be fatal. 
3. Hurdle Three: Antitrust and Collective Action Benefits 
 Because the entity in effect coordinates a huge set of IP owners in a 
given field—in the case of a DNA chip, the number is likely to be in the 
thousands, covering a vast number of the sequences relating to a particular 
medical condition—the entity must at least consider antitrust concerns. Al-
though this level of integration may indeed trigger a serious antitrust red 
                                                                                                                           
American May Lift Catch-Up Bid, Wall St. J., Nov. 4, 2005, at A6 (discussing attempt by the 
American Airlines pilots’ union to jump the gun on the next round of cuts proposed at their airline 
in order to gain position on other unions in negotiations with the company and noting that it was 
expected that this endeavor would also pressure other unions into talks with management and the 
union was planning on involving them in broader deals); Edward Wong & Steven Greenhouse, 
Tension Mounts Between United and Machinists, N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 2002, at C1 (reporting that 
to keep the airline out of bankruptcy court, pilots and attendants at United levied social pressure 
on the mechanics’ union to accept a second proposed agreement to $700 million in wage and 
benefit concessions after the mechanics’ union had rejected the first agreement by a 57–43 mar-
gin); Edward Wong, United Air’s Family Is Anything But, N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 2002, at 31 (illus-
trating a criticism by United’s pilots’ union of United’s machinists’ union for not making conces-
sions that could have kept the airline financially afloat, and instead risking bankruptcy and losing 
employee control of the company). 
46 A middle-ground strategy, discussed in more detail below in Part II.A, would be to keep 
those pieces of DNA in the project and proceed to commit acts that may ultimately constitute 
infringement with the expectation that the ordinary interactions that inevitably accompany the 
initiation and prosecution of an infringement suit will lead to the settlement of any such suits that 
are brought. To satisfy potential judgments that may come from these suits, a good faith estimate 
of all possible future demands for payment might be paid out on the front end into a separate trust 
for the benefit of future claimants. This technique is presently used for plaintiff class action suits 
in modern tort cases in which all plaintiffs have not yet even been identified. 
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flag, the social benefits conferred by such an arrangement are likely to miti-
gate these antitrust concerns. 
 It is important to recognize the limits of such antitrust concerns them-
selves. In the past, horizontal arrangements among practically the entire set 
of thousands of entities within a given field probably would have triggered 
a per se antitrust violation.47 But this is not likely to occur today for several 
reasons. First, the arrangement proposed here can be seen as vertical rather 
than horizontal because it is between the user of the IP (that is, the operating 
entity and the promoter) and the IP owners, rather than directly among the 
IP owners. Modern analysis of vertical integration is significantly more 
permissive.48 Second, in most cases per se treatment has been replaced by 
the “rule of reason.”49 The outcry within the literature over the anticom-
mons problem discussed earlier50—namely, that transaction costs block 
beneficial deals from taking place—itself essentially justifies the existence 
of substantial consumer benefits arising from the proposed transaction. The 
provision of a good or service by the operating entity that otherwise is not 
available to consumers is likely to satisfy a rule of reason analysis. Indeed, 
joint venture arrangements often satisfy a rule of reason antitrust analysis as 
being procompetitive precisely because consumers benefit from new offer-
ings.51
 The argument here recalls the type of analysis that has allowed artist 
rights collectives, such as ASCAP and BMI, to operate without violating the 
antitrust laws.52 Yet the case for finding no antitrust violation for the operat-
ing entity is even stronger than it is for ASCAP and BMI because the trans-
action provides additional benefits of the type often included in the sort of 
all-things-considered rule of reason analysis. For many of the items being 
bundled in the proposed entity there is no established market at all. In con-
trast, one factor that made the antitrust case against ASCAP and BMI as 
strong as it was is that established markets for artist rights did exist and so 
                                                                                                                           
47 Such an antitrust violation is governed by the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 
(2000 & Supp. IV 2004). See Phillip Areeda & Louis Kaplow, Antitrust Analysis: Problems, Text, 
Cases 166–202 (5th ed. 1997) (discussing per se illegality of price fixing); Joseph W. deFuria, Jr., 
Reasoning Per Se and Horizontal Price Fixing: An Emerging Trend in Antitrust Litigation?, 14 
Pepp. L. Rev. 39, 43 (1986) (stating that historically “horizontal price fixing practices were sen-
tenced to per se condemnation in a fairly traditional and predictable manner”). 
48 See generally Areeda & Kaplow, supra note 47, at 609–784. 
49 For more on the rule of reason, see id. at 165–251. 
50 See supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing anticommons problems in IP). 
51 See generally Areeda & Kaplow, supra note 47, at 203–51. 
52 See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 7 (1979); cf. Lichtman, 
supra note 32 (offering an account of collective rights organizations based on game theory). 
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the bundling of the rights could lead to real monopoly effects.53 Further, the 
proposed entity allows IP owners to coordinate with each other before mak-
ing significant investments in their own activities. Allowing a collective en-
terprise like the proposed operating entity at this time, before the DNA-on-
a-chip marketplace has matured, does not raise any serious spectre that IP 
owners will have their investment-backed expectations frustrated if the 
transaction passes antitrust muster. In addition, such coordination has the 
added benefit of promoting certain efficiencies. Also, unlike the relatively 
limited number of entities that operate like ASCAP and BMI, the proposed 
entity is in no way exclusive. It is anticipated that there could be large num-
bers of entities structured similarly to the operating entity and serving even 
fully or partially overlapping customer bases.54
4. Hurdle Four: Deal Acceptance 
 The purpose of the proposed deal structure is to provide an option that 
is attractive to both IP owners and users but that does not appear to have 
been considered previously. We believe that the proposed structure can 
achieve a transaction that is beneficial to all interested parties but otherwise 
is not getting done. It is nonetheless recognized that some may see the pro-
posal as one that essentially imposes itself on IP owners—as a kind of 
“cram down” plan for what amounts to mass infringement. That sort of 
mass infringement, if it were to occur, might repulse some, although it 
should be noted that there is always some risk of infringement in any IP-
intensive business. But even widespread infringement may be tolerated if 
the social benefits are sufficiently large. Indeed, the public response to an 
approach that is somewhat analogous to the proposed DNA-on-a-chip struc-
ture—namely, the model at the core of the Google Library Project— sug-
gests a far greater tolerance than might be anticipated for a business that 
may be seen as imposing agreement on IP owners.55 Indeed, to some extent, 
the Google Library Project is even seen as attractive or fashionable.56
                                                                                                                           
53 While the advent of broadcast music popularly supplanted previous music formats, there 
had been an established market for sheet music licensing before ASCAP and BMI. See Lucia S. 
Schultz, Performing-Right Societies in the United States, Notes, Mar. 1979, at 511, 513; ASCAP 
Celebrates 60th Anniversary, Music Educators J., Sept. 1974, at 104, 105. 
54 Indeed, because the inventors of the structure proposed in this Article (the Article’s authors) 
are academics able to extract some benefit if the ideas in the Article enjoy some general interest, 
they are less motivated to get the proposed entity patented. Cf. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Sig-
nature Fin. Group Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375–77 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding business methods are 
not exempted from being patentable); Julie Creswell, A Wall Street Rush to Patent Profit-Making 
Methods, N.Y. Times, Aug. 11, 2006, at C7. 
55 See, e.g., Kara Swisher, Technology (a Special Report): All Things Digital—-Debating the 
Google Suit, Wall St. J., June 19, 2006, at R8 (describing the Google project and quoting Larry 
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 Here we draw a loose analogy to the Google model as another example 
of an effort to solve a collective action problem among many IP owners. 
The Google Library Project essentially involves placing full-text versions of 
the contents of large libraries—books, journals, etc.— onto the Web in a 
way that makes them fully searchable and readable.57 Of course, many of 
these works are covered by copyrights, and at least some of the use by 
Google of such protected work would constitute infringement if not li-
censed by each owner. For this reason, Google and many of its supporters 
advocate expanding fair use or other privileges so that Google would not 
need to obtain licenses from the IP owners.58
 Whatever the virtues of the Google Library Project, the DNA-on-a-
chip business model should be even more attractive to the relevant commu-
nity of IP owners for a number of reasons outlined below. Plus, it will have 
potential life-saving consequences for society, which might assuage public 
resistance to any residual infringement or any sense that the proposed trans-
action is somehow being crammed down the throats of IP owners. 
 Like the Google Library Project, the proposed operating entity offers 
each IP owner a number of real, noncash benefits. First, the use to which the 
IP owner’s subject matter will be put in both the Google project and the 
proposed DNA-on-a-chip transaction is a use that the IP owner itself would 
find very difficult to achieve otherwise—unless it employed what is in es-
sence the same approach as the Google project or the one we propose in this 
Article. More specifically, both the Google project and the proposed entity 
provide a single pool of resources—an online library or a chip—in which 
somebody can search for the underlying IP—a copyrighted book or a pat-
                                                                                                                           
Lessig’s efforts to outline the project’s social benefits); Daniel Terdiman, A Tool for Scholars Who 
Like to Dig Deep, N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 2004, at G6 (describing favorable reaction of academics to 
the Google project). 
56 Indeed, since the original five-library plan was established, the University of California has 
been added to Google’s project while Microsoft announced a competing program for digitizing the 
collection of the British Library. See Motoko Rich, Arts Briefly: Google Snags Another Library, 
N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 2006, at E2; Robert A. Guth, Microsoft to Offer Digitized Books of British 
Library, Wall St. J., Nov. 4, 2005, at B5. 
57 For a general description of the Google project, see Google, Library Project, 
http://books.google.com/googleprint/library.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2006). 
58 See Joan Rigdon, Google, Books, and Fair Use, Wash. Lawyer, Mar. 2006, at 21 (discuss-
ing the project’s social benefits and the prospects for a more expansive approach to the doctrine of 
fair use to enable the project’s implementation without mass copyright infringement or the incur-
rence of transaction costs to obtain the requisite licenses). To be sure, the proposed DNA-on-a-
chip business entity is designed to operate in a way that will not constitute infringement because 
the IP rights will be licensed by the IP owners. Nevertheless, as mentioned previously, the pro-
posed entity may follow a middle-ground strategy, discussed in more detail below in Part II.A, 
under which some infringement could occur briefly until settlements can be reached in those in-
fringement actions that are brought. 
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ented DNA sequence—and such a single source for easy searching could 
only be achieved by bundling the assets. Second, for both the Google pro-
ject and the proposed entity, the use by consumers of the library or chip, 
respectively, is likely to generate for the IP owner important information 
about other potential uses of its IP in a way that generates complementary 
sales and other business opportunities. For example, the complementary 
sales of the proposed entity discussed earlier59 could be increased if the 
proposed entity maintains a Web page that is electronically searchable, as 
well as a set of links back to IP owners themselves. Analogously, the 
Google project “leads users to relevant book titles and then guides them to a 
library, the publisher or an online bookseller.”60 That is, these projects pro-
vide several types of advertising: they increase general awareness, they 
provide specific information about the underlying IP and its value directly 
to interested users by aggregating information and making it easily search-
able, and they direct those potential users directly to the IP owners. Like-
wise, the parallel Google Print Project provides consumers free referrals to 
a publisher’s products, thereby actually increasing demand for copyrighted 
material.61 Publishers have reported an increase in Website visitors and 
sales.62
 Unlike the Google model, the proposed DNA-on-a-chip structure pro-
vides the IP owners with two important forms of direct ownership in the 
project. First, the proposed entity provides each IP owner with a real cash 
payment.63 Second, depending on how the proposed entity’s governance 
structure is organized, the IP owners also will have some degree of control 
over the entity. More particularly, in addition to some de facto control given 
                                                                                                                           
59 See supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text. 
60 Elisabeth Hanratty, iBrief, Google Library: Beyond Fair Use?, 2005 Duke L. & Tech. Rev. 
10, ¶ 227, available at http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/PDF/2005DL 
TR0010.pdf. 
61 The Google Print Project is a joint effort between Google and publishers. The publishers 
choose which books are digitized and Google receives 50% of the revenue generated by its search 
function. See Ryan Eddings, Consumer News, Publishers Fight to Stop Google’s Library, 18 Loy. 
Consumer L. Rev. 266, 267 (2005) (discussing the Google Print Project). 
62 In an on-line case study, Google cites the 124% increase in visitors and nearly 400% in-
crease in sales for Print on Demand titles by the Penn State University Press. Google, Google 
Book Search Case Study, https://books.google.com/partner/pennstate (last visited Nov. 9, 2006). 
The increases have been attributed to participation in the Google Print Project. See generally 
Emily Anne Proskine, Note, Google’s Technicolor Dreamcoat: A Copyright Analysis of the Google 
Book Search Library Project, 21 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 213 (2006). 
63 At least at present it does not appear that the Google Library Project provides the copyright 
owner with any royalty payment. For a discussion of Google’s view on the legal issues relating to 
its project, see Jonathan Band, The Google Print Library Project: A Copyright Analysis, J. Internet 
Banking & Com., Dec. 2005, http://www.arraydev.com/commerce/ 
JIBC/2006-02/Band.htm. 
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their ability to at least threaten to hold out, the IP owners will have some 
type of express control through the votes they are issued. These rights to 
payment and control combine to give the IP owners a real ownership stake 
in the proposed entity, which should make the opportunity to participate 
even more attractive and further alleviate concerns that somehow the deal is 
being crammed down on them. 
II. Additional Obstacles and Limitations 
 The similarities that the proposed approach shares with the rough ana-
logs discussed above buttress our belief that the proposed transaction is 
achievable in practice, as the other approaches are able to overcome many 
of the same sorts of obstacles and limitations that the proposed DNA-on-a-
chip transaction likely faces. That said, we acknowledge that the proposed 
transaction faces some additional and unique obstacles and limitations. 
Some of the most serious of these are briefly discussed below. 
A. The Injunction Risk 
 One of the most serious obstacles to the implementation of the pro-
posed structure is the risk that an IP owner would proceed so far as to obtain 
an actual injunction, either based on a preemptive declaratory judgment ac-
tion or as part of a regular infringement action brought after the entity be-
gins operations.64 A judgment-proofing structure for the operating entity 
that takes advantage of limited liability and the bankruptcy regime would 
operate to mitigate these threats by decreasing the economic pool available 
to an IP owner making the threat.65 But a court-issued injunction is backed 
up by the contempt power of the court, which is a stronger sanction not 
blunted by a judgment-proofing structure because it puts at risk an entirely 
new pool of targets—individuals who face criminal sanctions. 
 Nevertheless, there are reasons the contempt power may not be in-
voked. First, without endorsing the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2006 decision in 
eBay v. MercExchange, L.L.C., about the availability of injunctions in pat-
ent cases,66 we note that as a consequence of the Court’s opinion, even if 
the operating entity is found to have infringed, the remedy may only be 
damages and not an injunction. Indeed, the extent to which many other IP 
                                                                                                                           
64 As indicated earlier, the operating entity could exclude the holdout’s DNA, but the struc-
ture does allow for the possibility that the entity may make the business decision to infringe or that 
the entity will infringe unintentionally. 
65 See supra note 24 for more on judgment proofing. 
66 See generally 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006) (discussing when permanent injunctions are available 
in disputes arising under the Patent Act). 
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owners have opted in to the proposed entity will be powerful evidence ei-
ther that opting in is in the best interests of an IP owner in a way that should 
encourage a court to avoid an injunction or that the deal offered by the pro-
posed entity is reasonable compensation in any damages calculation. Sec-
ond, the contempt power of the court is rarely, if ever, triggered on the 
court’s own initiative. As a result, contempt proceedings are likely to be 
avoided unless the IP owner who has won the injunction elects to seek such 
additional court action. While an IP owner might elect such aggressive and 
expensive measures, the bringing of the action for the initial judgment and 
the proceedings seeking a contempt order combine to provide substantial 
delay. The proposed entity can use this delay time to better educate the 
holdout IP owner about the rational case for participation. This time delay 
will enable sufficient exchange of information and subsequent reflection by 
the IP owner to allow him to reach the decision to participate. In addition, 
during this time the holdout may face ongoing peer and social pressure to 
opt in. 
 Put differently, the transaction costs and delay associated with an IP 
owner’s efforts to enforce its property rights can serve two often overlooked 
socially beneficial effects. First, transaction costs and delay discourage an 
IP owner from going full bore in enforcing its rights because it can be un-
economic to do so. Second, transaction costs and delay help IP owners and 
IP users coordinate with each other by providing the beacon effect needed 
to draw them together, the bargain effect needed to help them strike a deal, 
and the time needed to do both.67 In other words, the costs and delay of 
continued litigation can actually increase the likelihood that the parties will 
strike a deal, especially once the scope of the dispute becomes clearer as the 
litigation starts to unfold and the zone of bargaining becomes more appar-
ent. 
B. The Hostage Risk 
 One of the most serious limitations on the practicality of the proposed 
entity ironically arises if the business becomes too financially successful. 
As indicated above, if the business is particularly profitable, its profits may 
be a sufficiently attractive hostage for a holdout IP owner to threaten. Not 
only might the IP owner have a greater incentive to hold out in an attempt to 
expropriate more value for itself; but when the value of the hostage in-
                                                                                                                           
67 The beacon effect refers to the way an IP right can bring together all those interested in the 
commercialization of its underlying subject matter. The bargain effect refers to the way an IP right 
can help these diverse persons negotiate with each other once brought together. For more on these 
beacon and bargain effects, see Kieff, supra note 9, at 5, 13, 15–17. 
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creases as the operating entity generates larger profits, the operating entity, 
as well as the promoter and the licensor-IP owners, will face more pressure 
to accede to the holdout’s demands. In effect, this limitation restates the 
centrality of the structure’s basic commitment to self-restraint as a coordina-
tion facilitator. The question of hostages has been touched on above in Part 
I.B.1, but some additional points are worth making.  
 One way to help ensure the requisite self-restraint is to structure the 
interests held by the IP owners so that they are a percentage claim on the 
entity’s income and assets rather than a fixed amount. This can easily be 
achieved by structuring the operating entity as an LLC of which each licen-
sor-IP owner is a member. This illustrates a more general point regarding 
how the proposed structure contemplates that the promoter and the licensor-
IP owners will use transaction costs strategically to their advantage. If the 
licensor-IP owners simply had a fixed claim under a licensing agreement 
against the operating entity, such as a fixed dollar amount royalty, then it 
would be up to the operating entity and its management whether to give the 
holdout a larger piece of the pie, which would be increasing with the en-
tity’s profits. However, if the profits in effect are already committed to the 
licensor-IP owners as members of the LLC operating entity with an equity 
claim, then the licensor-IP owners in practice would have to agree to give 
the holdout a larger stake. Giving the holdout a preferred return would re-
quire restructuring the operating entity and its basic organizational and capi-
tal structure to create a new class of members.68 Given the number of li-
censor-IP owners that are anticipated, as well as their interest in not giving 
up any of their stake in the enterprise, getting their sign-off to treat a new 
member specially would be impracticable. 
 The governance structure of the entity69 and its economic arrangement 
thus will operate to undercut any hostage-taking strategy. The inevitable 
collective choice problems associated with getting members of the produc-
tion team, including those having actual voting rights like the other IP own-
ers, to go along provides an inherent check on the ability to restructure the 
deal in response to a holdout’s demand. In effect, the promoter and the li-
censor-IP owners can use the organizational structure of the operating entity 
to credibly commit not to revise the deal in response to a holdout’s de-
mands.70
                                                                                                                           
68 The LLC (or operating) agreement presumably would include a provision requiring the ap-
proval of its members to create new classes of members. 
69 Depending on business form, this governance structure will be embodied in an LLC (or op-
erating) agreement, partnership agreement, or shareholder agreement. 
70 Such precommitment tactics are a well-known means of gaining an advantage in so-called 
“chicken” or “hawk-dove” games. One could conceptualize the promoter and licensor-IP owners’ 
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 Further, the entity’s organizational documents may include some kind 
of express most-favored-nation (“MFN”) clause that would give each IP 
owner the right to the same treatment as the most-favored IP owner. This 
right to equal treatment effectively undercuts the ability for any one IP 
owner to obtain preferential treatment because it makes granting any IP 
owner better terms too costly. 
 In sum, collective choice problems and MFN clauses work by building 
inflexibility into the deal, which means that the promoter, the operating en-
tity’s management team, and other relevant constituencies credibly can tell a 
holdout that their hands are tied and that they simply cannot give the holdout 
a better deal.71 As game theorists Avinash Dixit and Barry Nalebuff put it:  
You might have thought that leaving options open is always pref-
erable. But in the realm of game theory that is no longer true. 
Your lack of freedom has strategic value. It changes other players’ 
expectations about your future responses, and you can turn this to 
your advantage. Others know that when you have the freedom to 
act, you also have the freedom to capitulate. To quote Oscar Wilde, 
“I can resist anything except temptation.”72
Or as Adam Brandenburger and Nalebuff explained: “[MFNs] are an in-
stance of ‘strategic inflexibility.’ People often think that having more flexibil-
ity is one of those universally good things. It isn’t. Sometimes you have 
more power when your hands are tied.”73
 Another strategy, discussed earlier as a basic feature of the structure,74 
is for the entity to avoid accumulating title to assets. The entity likely needs 
only access to operating assets—plants, office space, equipment, etc.—not 
ownership. These assets can be rented from anybody, but because of the 
opportunity for complementary business opportunities discussed earlier, 
members of the proposed entity’s production team may have sufficient in-
                                                                                                                           
credible commitment to a nonnegotiable LLC agreement as a commitment to “drive straight” in a 
game of chicken, encouraging any holdout-IP owner to “swerve,” which, in the context of the 
proposed deal, means to grant the operating entity a license. See Avinash K. Dixit & Barry J. 
Nalebuff, Thinking Strategically: The Competitive Edge in Business, Politics, and Everyday Life 
119–67, 205–22 (1991) (discussing credible commitment and brinksmanship). For a classic work 
that bears on the analysis here, see generally Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (1960); 
see also generally Adam M. Brandenburger & Barry J. Nalebuff, Co-opetition (1996) (studying 
strategies players can employ to change the game to their advantage). 
71 See Brandenburger & Nalebuff, supra note 70, at 161–69. 
72 Dixit & Nalebuff, supra note 70, at 120. 
73 See Brandenburger & Nalebuff, supra note 70, at 165–66. 
74 See supra Part I.B.1. 
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terest in the entity’s success that they are willing to rent their assets to the 
entity at more favorable rates. 
 Additionally, the operating entity could be run so that its net profits are 
relatively small, thereby further avoiding the existence of a potential hostage 
for a holdout to threaten. For good measure, the operating entity would be 
encouraged to pay out any profits it does earn in regular distributions to the 
promoter and the licensor-IP owners. 
C. IP Owner Heterogeneity 
 We also recognize that there likely will be some diversity among the IP 
owners’ contributions in a way that argues against treating them as entirely 
homogeneous. Some IP owners, for example, may provide a DNA sequence 
that everybody recognizes at the outset is more valuable than others. This 
triggers difficult questions about how to allocate different financial payoffs 
and control to each participating IP owner. Of course, the greater heterogene-
ity there is, the more difficult it will be to get all these deals done. Addition-
ally, once the deal structure accommodates IP owner heterogeneity, flexibility 
is reintroduced into the transaction. There then would be room for the IP 
owner to claim it deserves a larger piece of the pie because its IP is “differ-
ent,” and the deal structure would presumably contemplate treating some IP 
owners on a preferred basis. For reasons explained above, this fuels the hos-
tage risk. But the very logic of the underlying anticommons problem to which 
the proposed structure responds presumes a vast homogeneous pool of IP 
holders, as the anticommons problem generally presupposes considerable 
homogeneity. Put differently, if there really were a high degree of heterogene-
ity, which we think implies in most instances a manageable number of impor-
tant players to negotiate with, then the important players could be dealt with 
using existing strategies and the remaining unimportant players could be 
omitted from the deal precisely because they are unimportant. 
 The precise details of different arrangements to address whatever het-
erogeneity exists will have to wait until actual deals are struck, and there are 
many reasons to think that any heterogeneity concerns can be resolved. In-
deed, deals of all sorts get done when parties make very different types of 
contributions with very different valuations. That said, treating all IP own-
ers the same regardless of their contribution ultimately may be the best op-
tion so long as IP owners have an incentive to opt in, as we believe they will 
even if they would prefer a larger stake. 
D. Legal and Regulatory Risk 
 Finally, the proposed deal, like any other deal, faces general legal and 
regulatory risk. The regulatory landscape could shift so that the deal is pro-
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hibited or at least uneconomic. A court also could find that the transaction is 
illegal under current law. A particular risk with the proposed transaction, 
aside from antitrust scrutiny, is the risk that the veil of limited liability will 
be pierced, putting assets of the promoter and licensor-IP owners at risk.75 
The risk of piercing may be most acute if the operating entity is grossly un-
dercapitalized or is seen as being established for the purpose of engaging in 
mass infringement.76 We also recognize, however, that corporate structures 
designed to take advantage of limited liability are more routinely upheld by 
courts. We envision that the operating entity will have its own management 
team, will confer some control on the IP owners and will not simply be the 
promoter’s alter ego, will respect corporate formalities, will not commingle 
funds with the promoter or any of the IP owners, and will be adequately 
capitalized to carry on its business. Further, the proposed transaction is de-
signed to engineer a deal without mass willful infringement. In other words, 
the circumstances that generally must exist in order for a court to pierce 
should not exist in the deal as contemplated. 
 As with any deal, good faith and well-reasoned opinions of counsel pre-
sumably will have to be obtained as a condition to consummating the transac-
tion. And even still, some parties may not have the gumption to participate in 
the proposed transaction. But this is a general risk and transaction cost that 
faces any new deal structure. If there is enough value on the table, parties will 
get comfortable with legal and regulatory uncertainty. After all, somebody 
always has to go first. 
 At bottom, the likely sweet spot for the proposed entity is a business 
that makes arrays of DNA on a chip where the pieces of DNA are each pro-
tected by a patent. This is a business in which there is likely to be general 
homogeneity and ex ante uncertainty among IP owners as to the value of 
each of their IP assets. It also is one in which, by design, there very well 
may not be huge profits available from the operating business. But real 
value will come from using this technology to diagnose or segment popula-
tions into subpopulations that can be more profitably and more effectively 
treated in a targeted way. In such a case, large profits and large customer 
benefits are likely to be associated with complementary businesses, such as 
actual therapies and more focused diagnostics. 
                                                                                                                           
75 See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
76 See William P. Hackney & Tracey G. Benson, Shareholder Liability for Inadequate Capi-
tal, 43 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 837, 885-87 (1982); Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Veil Within Corpo-
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III. On the Risks of Legal Reform 
 This Article’s private ordering approach avoids several risks associated 
with the legal reforms that others may offer to avoid or mitigate the anti-
commons problem.77 The risks of legal reform are private, borne directly by 
the potential participants involved in some transactions, but they also are 
social and borne by society in general. A full evaluation of the merits of the 
proposed structure as compared to legal reform requires an in-depth analy-
sis of both the costs and benefits of these alternatives. The following discus-
sion is offered just to introduce some of the costs the proposed structure is 
designed to avoid. 
 The risks associated with legal reform proposals are several. First, be-
cause the anticommons effect is so ill-defined, there is a serious line-
drawing problem raised by any effort to target the problem with legal re-
form. For some, the problem is seen as triggered by too many upstream IP 
rights. But the nature of every upstream right is that it is associated with a 
corresponding downstream potential infringer. As a result, any potential 
infringer will always be able to make an anticommons argument. Second, 
the subjective nature of the anticommons effect thus gives rise to the risk 
that any government body charged with administering new rules responsive 
to the anticommons problem will be unduly influenced by some party 
claiming there is an anticommons. This sets the stage for a public choice 
problem, where in the name of decreasing transaction costs and monopoly 
effects agency decision making actually leads to the opposite result because 
big business will be better able to sway bureaucrats and political players 
than small business. When the key playing field is for control of legislative 
and regulatory bodies, it is unlikely that a start-up business will win the 
game of regulatory capture. Third, legal reform—whether is it achieved 
through new statutes, new rules and regulations, or new judicial doctrines—
introduces uncertainty. The lack of certainty and predictability can frustrate 
business efforts and private contracting as parties are unclear about who has 
what rights.78 Finally, legal reform takes time to implement. In contrast, the 
private ordering approach outlined here can be pursued immediately. 
                                                                                                                           
77 See supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text for examples of proposed legal reforms to 
address the anticommons problem. 
78 The authors have addressed the importance of certainty and predictability elsewhere. See F. 
Scott Kieff & Troy A. Paredes, The Basics Matter: At the Periphery of Intellectual Property, 73 
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IV. Some Implications for IP Theory 
 The type of private ordering approach offered here raises several im-
plications for IP theory. Most obviously, its focus on coordination is tied 
closely to prior work by the present authors on the coordina-
tion/commercialization theory of IP.79 The proposed structure provides yet 
another example of the way this theory helps those wanting to use the sub-
ject matter covered by IP at least as much as it helps the owners of IP. Put 
differently, the approach, which is designed to help a user avoid what oth-
erwise would be a vast number of infringement suits, is a concrete, if not 
extreme, example of the way the coordination/commercialization theory of 
IP is not properly seen as being “pro-IP owners.” 
 The proposed DNA-on-a-chip transaction highlights the importance of 
allowing parties to order their affairs as they see fit against the backdrop of 
default rules rather than immutable rules. The importance of such flexible 
contracting has been addressed by the present authors in earlier work devel-
oping the so-called “basics matter” approach to analyzing IP transactions 
under the law.80 One of the more important implications of the structure is 
that it provides a concrete example of how parties and their lawyers can 
engineer deals in creative ways to avoid the threat of myriad IP infringe-
ment suits while commercializing the IP to the benefit of society. In the few 
cases in which there is an act of infringement, the deal structure belies a 
conclusion that the infringement is willful—the entire enterprise is designed 
to avoid infringement by welcoming in all impacted IP owners—which sig-
nificantly decreases the risk of enhanced damages and attorney fees. Thus, 
the proposed deal structure largely caps the downside risk of any residual 
infringement. To be sure, because the deal structure would likely crumble in 
the face of criminal liability, it and other private ordering approaches like it 
provide strong reason for us to continue to keep the patent system free of 
the type of criminal sanctions that are available under the copyright sys-
tem.81
 Lastly, the approach offered here has serious implications for how the 
law of indirect infringement evolves. The 2005 U.S. Supreme Court deci-
sion in MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.,82 which made clear that both 
                                                                                                                           
79 For more on this approach to IP, see generally Kieff, supra note 17; Kieff, supra note 9. 
80 See, e.g., Kieff & Paredes, supra note 78, at 179–83, 189–90; F. Scott Kieff, Contrived 
Conflicts: The Supreme Court vs. The Basics of Intellectual Property Law, 30 Wm. Mitchell L. 
Rev. 1717, 1726, 1731 (2004). 
81 Cf. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94–553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17 
U.S.C.A. § 506(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2005)) (imposing criminal liability for copyright infringe-
ment in certain circumstances). 
82 545 U.S. 913 (2005). 
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forms of indirect infringement—inducement and contributory—are viable 
causes of action for copyrights as well as for patents, only highlights the 
need for more analysis in this area. This need is bolstered by recent con-
cerns that inducement causes of action, especially under newly proposed 
legislation, could reach those financing and managing parties—such as 
banks and venture funds—that end up being direct infringers.83 Similarly, 
within the context of the proposed operating entity, the promoters of such an 
entity might be targets in their personal capacities for a claim of indirect 
infringement to the extent the entity infringes the IP rights of any holdout IP 
owner. 
 We have elsewhere highlighted that causes of action for indirect in-
fringement are designed to step in where the indirect infringer is causing the 
same economic effect as direct infringement.84 Mark Lemley has recently 
argued that indirect infringement should be designed for cases where “the 
actual infringer either is not the truly responsible party or is impractical to 
sue.”85 The structure this Article develops is somewhat consistent with the 
second of these two classes, but not the first. In fact, the approach offered 
here suggests the focus should be on an alleged inducer’s ex ante effect in 
facilitating or frustrating coordination. A private ordering solution to the 
public problem of the anticommons is a good case for a safe harbor. That is, 
rather than endeavor to judge the relative responsibility of the potential in-
fringers (direct and indirect), the legal analysis that is more compatible with 
ex ante predictability and private ordering focuses only on those acts that at 
the time conducted are likely to cause the same economic effect as direct 
infringement, which is to say frustrating coordination. Although this is not 
identical to Lemley’s “impractical to sue” point when that determination is 
measured in the ex post world, it is designed to capture those efforts for in-
fringement that ex ante are designed to work because they would leave only 
direct infringers who are impractical to sue. In the case of the private ordering 
solution to the anticommons problem, the proposed entity is instead facilitat-
ing coordination and therefore should be considered a desirable solution, and 
not appropriate for a judgment of indirect infringement. 
                                                                                                                           
83 See generally Intentional Inducement of Copyright Infringements Act of 2004: Hearing on 
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Conclusion 
 The utility of any approach to problem solving depends on the circum-
stances of a given situation; different circumstances may warrant different 
solutions. Sometimes legal reform is appropriate. But sometimes private 
parties can overcome obstacles by finding creative ways to partner in an 
attempt to coordinate their activities and resources. Many people criticize 
lawyers as being part of the problem— as a transaction cost that clogs the 
system. Though this may be true at times, lawyers often are critical in get-
ting things done. 
 This Article is in keeping with the literature that sees the role of lawyers 
as transaction cost engineers. This Article explores preliminary thoughts on a 
private ordering solution to the anticommons problem by focusing on both 
coordination and self-restraint in relation to property rights and commercial 
transactions. The details of the proposed structure would have to be negoti-
ated in the context of an actual deal, but we are optimistic that the structure is 
workable in practice and not just in theory. We also are confident that the ba-
sic structure is viable beyond DNA-on-a-chip technology and could be ap-
plied in other contexts in which the anticommons problem arises. We do not 
at this point make the strong claim that the private ordering solution is neces-
sarily preferable to legal reform, but offer it as a worthy alternative for evalua-
tion and for its connections to the coordination/commercialization view of IP. 
Additionally, the proposal has some explanatory power for aspects of the le-
gal doctrine of indirect infringement that are puzzling under other theories of 
IP. Finally, the proposed model shows some important ways in which the co-
ordination/commercialization theory is not accurately viewed as being “pro-
IP owners.” While the DNA-on-a-chip transaction we propose benefits the 
business interests of the promoter and the licensor-IP owners, consumers also 
win as new diagnoses and treatments become available. 
